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I. Introduction
Over the last 20 years, state legislatures, when enacting tort re-
form legislation, have insinuated themselves into areas where the
courts traditionally have controlled the decisionmaking. 1 On those
occasions where state legislatures have tried to correct alleged flaws
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond Law School.
** Associate, Hartman, Underhill and Brubaker, Lancaster, Pa.
Many thanks to Professors David Sonnenshein and Anthony Bocchino of the Temple Law
School faculty, who reviewed early drafts. Also thanks to Beth Van Hoeven, a Temple Law
School student, who provided invaluable research support.
1. See Farrell, Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap and the Doctrine of Substantive
Due Process, 23 TORT & INs. L.J 684, 687-88. There has been two movements of tort reform
in the last twenty years, which have been brought about by an alleged insurance crisis. One
was instituted in the early 1970s and the other in the early 1980s. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 97-117 (1985). Some legislation has
proposed reducing statutes of limitations, doing away with the collateral source rule, changing
pretrial procedure by requiring panel reviews, instituting requirements for negligence in all
medical malpractice cases, and imposing caps on damages. See infra text accompanying notes
37-43.
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in a court's processes, a number of state supreme courts have re-
sisted the invasions.' These courts have ruled that such legislation
violates their state constitutions' equal protection or due process
clauses.3 In examining the constitutionality of tort reform legislation,
these courts have adopted an intermediate scrutiny test.' The most
recent examples involve courts that have held statutes that place
caps on damages in medical malpractice cases to be
unconstitutional .
5
In holding damage caps unconstitutional, these courts have be-
come courts' rights advocates." These cases may be viewed best as
courts protecting their rights to decide certain essential aspects of
civil disputes. The courts fear that if the decision-making processes
of the legislature regarding tort law are presumed to be reasonable,
as some have argued, then state legislatures will erode the adjudica-
tive process. In a sense, the legislatures are stripping the courts of
their power to decide tort cases and controversies.
7
The purpose of this article is to examine medical malpractice
damage cap cases in order to discern what authority courts have uti-
lized in reviewing tort reform legislation. Before examining the caps
cases, however, the early history of judicial review of tort reform
legislation will be addressed. A historical analysis is necessary in or-
der to understand the development of the modern day framework of
analysis. Today, the trend is toward equal protection analysis. In this
regard, cases that deal with the constitutionality of worker's compen-
2. See infra text accompanying notes 44-86.
3. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 407 (1976); Carson v.
Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 44-86.
4. Farrell, supra note 1, at 690. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1987);
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97
Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977). See also Wright v. Cen-
tral Du Page Hosp. Assoc., 63 11. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (on due process grounds).
See contra Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr.
368, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) (appeal dismissed for lack of a substantial federal
question); Silby v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. Stat, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985); Prendergast v.
Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
5. See generally supra note 4.
6. See Harlan, Virginia's New Medical Malpractice Review Panel and Some Questions
it Raises, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 51, 58 (1976). This institutional struggle seems to be based on
principles other than individual state constitutional language and affects the rights of citizens
to have the courts decide cases or controversies. See infra text accompanying notes 71-76 and
137-46. But see, Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (vesting its decision on its under-
standing of the Texas Constitution). See infra text accompanying notes 137-45.
7. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), reh'g denied, 672 F. Supp. 915
(W.D. Va. 1987). See also Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights
out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981) (Tribe argues that there
should be court resistance to Congressional attempts to carve out certain fundamental consti-
tutional areas of decisionmaking authority). See infra text accompanying notes 147-56.
DAMAGES AND COURTS' RIGHTS
sation statutes and guest statutes will be examined. Additionally, re-
cent caps cases will be discussed to show the difficulty that state
courts have in justifying their decisions under equal protection analy-
sis. Three other cases will also be analyzed in order to develop a new
due process argument. Finally, this article argues that the trend to-
ward due process analysis is preferred because the due process lan-
guage is more suited for identifying the separation of powers basis
for a court's authority regarding caps. The focus of the courts is
more accurately labelled a balancing-of-powers concern rather than
the concern typically expressed under equal protection analy-
sis-which is, that there is insufficient proof of cause and effect be-
tween a statute's purpose and its method.
II. Early Collisions Between Tort Reform Legislation and the
Courts
The courts that advocate courts' rights are not acting totally
without precedent in holding caps in medical malpractice cases un-
constitutional. Early in this century, state courts applied similar rea-
soning in dealing with economic legislation, which allowed them to
use a high level of scrutiny in their standard of review.8 For exam-
ple, in the 1911 case of Ives v. South Buffalo Railway, the New
York Court of Appeals used a substantive due process analysis in
holding that New York's worker's compensation statute violated the
state's constitution because it bore no relationship to the health,
safety or morals of employees.9 The court in Ives was troubled by
the strict liability standard in the statute and stated the following:
If such economic and sociological arguments as are here ad-
vanced in support of this statute can be allowed to subvert the
fundamental idea of property, then there is no private right en-
tirely safe, because there is no limitation upon the absolute dis-
cretion of Legislatures, and the guarantees of the Constitution
are a mere waste of words. 0
Ives is startling because it justifies the heightened scrutiny of
8. See Comment, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach, 88
YALE L.J. 1487 (1979). See also Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E.431 (1911),
rev'd, Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d I (1975). There
is also evidence of a Supreme Court position on courts' rights in New York Central R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). For treatment by the Supreme Court see generally McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT.
REV. 34; Tussman and tenBrock, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1949); Gray, Developments in the Law of Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
9. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
10. Id. at 295-96, 94 N.E. at 439-40.
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the statute by defining the court's role as the balancing protector of
individual common law property rights from the legislature. The
court viewed the legislature as an imperfect voice of community
opinion. It regarded the common law understanding of property as
part of the implied bargain between the state and its people. Under-
lying its holding is a belief that this implied bargain is part of a
social contract that may be altered only when a clear showing has
been made. The common law of torts was part of this basic bargain.
Ives protected the court's traditional method of deciding cases by
finding that aspects of tort law were basic to the plain meaning of
the words "due process." 11 Thus, it require the legislature to satisfy
the court that the legislation would protect the public.12
Ultimately, the court in Ives held that the New York worker's
compensation statute violated constitutional rights. This holding,
however, was short-lived. In New York Central Railroad v. White,
the Supreme Court held that New York's worker's compensation
statute was constitutional at the federal level." In the time period
between Ives and White, however, New York had amended its con-
stitution to provide for worker's compensation.14 On a federal consti-
tutional level, the Supreme Court articulated a different due process
analysis, which gave more deference to the state in enacting legisla-
tion that affected citizens' property rights. 5
The Court in White announced a rational basis test for deter-
mining the constitutionality of worker's compensation statutes. The
Court stated, however, that both the employer and employee re-
ceived a quid pro quo from the statute because their respective
II. We repeat, however, that this power must be exercised within the constitutional lim-
itations which prescribe the law of the land. "Due process of law" is process due according to
the law of the land, and the phrase as used in the fourteenth amendment of the federal consti-
tution with reference to the power of the states means the general law of the several states as
fixed or guaranteed by their constitutions. As stated by Mr. Webster, in the Dartmouth Col-
lege Case, "the law of the land is the general law, the law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial." Id.at 300, 94 N.E. at
442.
12. The New York Court of Appeals stated that
In order to sustain legislation under the police power, the courts must be
able to see that its operation tends in some degree to prevent some offense or
evil, or to preserve public health, morals, safety, and welfare. If it discloses no
such purpose, but is clearly calculated to invade the liberty and property of pri-
vate citizens, it is plainly the duty of the courts to declare it invalid.
Id. at 301, 94 N.E. at 443.
13. New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
14. R. EPSTEIN, G. GREGORY, & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 915 (4th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter R. EPSTEIN].
15. Perhaps the Supreme Court decided it was unnecessary to go through a constitu-
tional process to provide for worker's compensation. Alternatively, perhaps it simply believed
that the statute delegated adjudication power to worker's compensation boards.
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losses of rights were offset by other gains in rights. The difficulty
with the quid pro quo language in White is that the Court did not
state whether the quid pro quo was necessary to a rational basis
finding. The concern then is whether the quid pro quo requirement
is simply dicta. Furthermore, the Court did not require any proof
that each party would gain rights equal to those rights which were
lost."8 It simply ruled that there was a reasonable relation between
the purpose of the statute and the means it sought to employ.
17
For a period of time after White, most commentators read the
quid pro quo language as dicta and announced that the federal
courts would no longer use a substantive due process analysis to
strike down state economic legislation.18 And, until the late 1970s,
most federal courts seem to give great deference to the states in the
area of economic rights. 19 In order to be consistent with federal
precedents, many state courts avoided substantive due process and
relied instead on equal protection analysis in reviewing tort reform
legislation. A due process analysis was used only as an
afterthought.2"
Guest statute legislation is a prime example of state courts us-
ing equal protection arguments to invalidate proposed reforms. A
majority of the twenty opinions considering guest statutes has held
them unconstitutional." Representative opinions invalidated guest
legislation on the bases that the statutes violated both the equal pro-
tection clauses of their state constitutions and the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 2 These courts ruled that the
classifications between paying and nonpaying passenger within the
guest statutes was arbitrary and capricious.2 3 The courts held that
the states failed to prove that it was inhospitable for a guest to sue a
16. White, 243 U.S. at 208.
17. Id. at 205-06. The court reserved judgment on the question of whether the compen-
sation prescribed by the workers compensation statute was unreasonable. Id. See infra text
accompanying notes 154-62.
18. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1487. See also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
548, 616 (9th ed. 1975).
19. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1487 n.4.
20. There is no agreement among the commentators whether there needs to be conform-
ity between the state and federal courts in their use of due process analysis. See Paulsen, The
Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950). See contra
Carpenter, Our Constitutional Heritage: Economic Due Process and the State Courts, 45
A.B.A. J. 1027 (1959) (active state review represents a return to the median tradition of reason
and moderation). The quid pro quo analysis has been held to rest on uncertain principles. See
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978).
21. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 486.
22. See, e.g., Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974).
23. See Annotation, Constitutionality of Automobile and Aviation Guest Statutes, 66
A.L.R.3d 532 (1975 & Supp.).
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negligent driver since liability insurance existed to cover the dam-
ages. 4 Moreover, the courts rejected the states' arguments that such
law suits are collusive in nature, finding such reasoning to be overin-
clusive.23 Furthermore, some courts declared that guest statutes pre-
vented legitimate claims from ever reaching the courts."6 The major-
ity of the courts were affronted by the argument that they were
incompetent at distinguishing collusive claims from meritorious
claims. 7 The legislatures had unreasonably intruded into the courts'
decision-making arena regarding an essential aspect of personal in-
jury law.
Some courts noted that equal protection arguments were helpful
in identifying the source of their discomfort over guest statutes.
Other courts, however, had great difficulty aligning such reasoning
with the Supreme Court's analysis of the equal protection clause. 8
Many courts and commentators argued that the standard of review
in guest statute cases should be consistent with the review in sub-
stantive due process cases like White, in which great deference was
given to the legislation because the people had spoken through their
elected officials. 9 In prior cases involving federal statutes, the Su-
preme Court had ruled that if neither a fundamental right nor a
suspect classification was involved, then great deference should be
given to Congress. 30 States thus argued that their legislatures should
be afforded the same deference as Congress because their statutes
were also the result of political processes that presumably reflected
the will of constituents. 1 The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, refused to rule on guest statutes as a federal constitutional
question, but did recognize the validity of guest statutes in dicta.
32
With this background, several courts have recently implemented
higher scrutiny tests to hold statutes that impose caps on damages in
medical malpractice cases to be unconstitutional.33 These cases are
the most striking evidence that state courts are, at times, willing to
24. Id.
25. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 485.
26. Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974); Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d
855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388, (1973).
27. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 14, at 485.
28. Id. at 487.
29. See Annotation, supra note 23. See also Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive
Due Process and the Courts, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91 (1950).
30. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1487.
31. Id.
32. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 124 (1929).
33. See cases cited supra note 3. See also Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va.
1986), reh'g denied, 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987).
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fight encroachment on their decisionmaking power. The courts that
support courts' rights have reached their decisions despite the federal
courts' tendency to show great deference to legislation affecting
neither a fundamental right nor or a suspect classification.
III. The Background to Caps Legislation: Is there an Insurance
Crisis, and Will Caps Alleviate It?
Since the mid-1980s, numerous state legislatures have been told
that their states are experiencing a crisis in health care. The crisis
has been characterized as a nationwide crisis and is said to be a
result of a dramatic increase in the costs associated with providing
medical malpractice insurance. As a result of these increased costs,
insurance companies that provide medical malpractice coverage to
physicians and other health care workers are either dramatically in-
creasing their premiums for such insurance, or are refusing to offer
coverage in this area.34 Consequently, a number of physicians are
leaving high risk specialty areas3" that are most severely affected by
the increase in insurance costs. These physicians are relocating in
other specialties and geographical areas that are not as severely im-
pacted by the crisis." This migration of physicians and other health
care providers arguably has decreased the availability of health care
in high risk specialties and in certain geographical areas. Addition-
ally, the increased cost-of medical malpractice insurance is passed
along to consumers in the form of higher prices for health care
services.3 7
The question then becomes: What is causing the increase in
costs? The primary reason alleged by many insurance companies,
physicians and their organized lobbies is that there has been a dra-
matic increase in both the number of medical malpractice claims
filed, and the severity of awards 8 paid on these claims. 39 The propo-
nents of this theory argue that the large awards justify damage caps
because caps are designed to limit the escalation in the number of
34. Treviranus, Medical Malpractice: Constitutional Implications of a Cap on Dam-
ages, 7 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 61 (1987) [hereinafter Treviranus].
35. An example of a high risk specialty area is obstetrics, which has experienced a
tripling in the number of medical malpractice claims filed in the field from 1976 to 1981. The
increase in claims has resulted in a dramatic increase in the cost of medical malpractice insur-
ance for this field. G. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 70's: A Retrospective,
49 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 5, 31 (1986).
36. See Treviranus, supra note 34, at 61.
37. Id. at 62.
38. Increase in the severity of awards refers to the increase in the dollar amount paid on
claims settled both in and out of court.
39. See Treviranus, supra note 34, at 61.
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claims by setting a maximum dollar amount that a plaintiff may re-
cover. It is also argued that the increase in the severity of awards
naturally results in increased costs that must be paid by insurance
companies. These increased costs are then passed along to the in-
sureds in the form of higher premiums. Additionally, the increase in
the number of medical malpractice claims reflects an increase in the
risks associated with these fields. The higher risks covered by the
insurance companies logically results in higher premiums.
In addition to the direct costs associated with the increase in
medical malpractice claims, some commentators claim there are also
indirect costs which are imposed on society such as: (1) loss of pro-
ductivity from physicians who have to defend malpractice claims; (2)
reduced access to care for the public when physicians discontinue
practicing in certain locations and specialties or refuse to perform
certain procedures; and (3) an increase in the costs of health care
services due to the practice of defensive medicine.4 °
In an attempt to deal with this "crisis," numerous proposals for
"tort reform" in the area of medical malpractice have been sug-
gested. The proposed changes would make it more difficult for plain-
tiffs to bring claims, decrease the costs associated with medical mal-
practice suits, and decrease the amount of recovery for medical
malpractice plaintiffs. Some specific proposals include: requiring
binding arbitration and/or medical pre-trial screening panels for all
malpractice claims; limiting attorneys' fees; placing caps on the
amount plaintiffs can recover; requiring awards to be made in peri-
odic payments by the insurance companies; shortening the statute of
limitations for medical malpractice claims; decreasing plaintiffs'
awards by the amount of reimbursement received from collateral
sources; and modifying the duty of care owed by a physician to a
patient.41 This article will focus primarily on the tort reform of dam-
40. Defensive medicine has been defined as "the alternation of modes of medicine prac-
tices, induced by the threat of liability, for the principle purpose of forestalling the possibility
of law suits by patients as well as providing a good deal of legal defense in the event such law
suits are instituted." Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report on the Secre-
tary's Commission on Medical Malpractice (1973).
Health care providers responding to the threat of medical malpractice litigation may (1)
perform additional diagnostic tests and/or treatment procedures; (2) maintain more detailed
patient records; (3) increase the number of follow-up visits by patients. It has been argued by
the American Medical Association that these costs are unnecessary and are primarily the re-
sult of the license threat of litigation. The Association of Trial Lawyers of America, however,
have counter-argued that this "defensive medicine" is merely careful medicine. UNITED
STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INSURANCE COSTS IN-
CREASED BUT VARIED AMONG PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS, HRD-86-112, at 12.
41. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: SIX-
STATE CASE STUDY SHOW CLAIMS AND INSURANCE COSTS STILL RISE DESPITE REFORMS,
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age caps.
IV. Equal Protection Challenges to Caps in State Courts
Damage caps are statutory limits placed on the amount of dam-
ages a medical malpractice plaintiff may recover for his or her inju-
ries. There are basically two types of damage caps. One type of cap
is a non-economic cap, which limits the amount a plaintiff may re-
cover for non-economic losses that are the result of medical malprac-
tice."2 Non-economic losses are intangible losses, such as pain and
suffering, as opposed to real losses, such as medical expenses and loss
of income.43 The other type of cap is a total cap, which limits both
the non-economic and economic damages that a plaintiff may re-
cover. 4 In either case, a court's ability to award damages is limited
by a statutory cap. Total caps, however, are more restrictive than
non-economic caps. Consequently, total caps are more likely to be
held unconstitutional because such restrictions may prevent seriously
injured plaintiffs from even collecting their out-of-pocket costs.
As previously stated, the most common challenge to damage
caps is that caps violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution.45 The equal protec-
tion clause basically insured that similarly situated people are
treated equally. Caps, however, create several distinct discriminatory
classifications. First, some caps distinguish malpractice tort victims
from general tort victims. Such caps may be discriminatory in na-
ture if they only limit the recovery of the former class of victims.46
Second, some courts traditionally have held caps that distinguish be-
tween seriously injured malpractice patients to be discriminatory if
such caps only limit the recovery of the former.47 Some courts have
also noted that some caps create both of the above classifications."8
The courts have applied two different levels of judicial scrutiny
to determine if caps violate equal protection. 9 The first test is the
HRD-87-21.
42. Treviranus, supra note 34, at 67.
43. For example, in California, the statute limits non-economic damages to $250,000.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West Supp. 1989).
44. Treviranus, supra note 34, at 67.
45. "No state shall ... deny to any persons within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. Treviranus, supra note 34, at 67.
47. Id. at 67.
48. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368 (1985).
49. Treviranus, supra note 34, at 67. Courts have sometimes used a "strict scrutiny" test
in examining whether a particular law violates the equal protection clause. This test has only
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"rational basis test."50 Under the rational basis test, states enacting
legislation must have a legitimate state interest or reason for enact-
ing the law, and the law must rationally relate to the state's objec-
tive. 1 This test is typically applied to all laws that do not require the
strict scrutiny test. Courts, in applying the rational basis test, gener-
ally take an extremely deferential approach in examining the law for
equal protection violations.5 2 Courts normally presume that the legis-
lature has acted in a constitutional manner. Consequently, a cap that
creates a discriminatory classification will be upheld so long as there
is any statement of fact from the legislature that may reasonably be
used as a justification for the law." The rational basis test is com-
monly used by courts that uphold caps as constitutional. These
courts trust the legislatures' method of determining when a problem
exists and the legislatures' solution of a blanket answer to the prob-
lem. Such courts impliedly believe that the republican form of gov-
ernment, relying on its various political constituencies to gather the
necessary information, is working well and generally serving society
well. If there are no historical flaws in the legislative process and no
fundamental rights or suspect classifications are involved, then the
courts defer to the "findings" of the legislatures and their blanket
solutions.
California, a traditionally plaintiff-oriented state, surprisingly
was one of the leaders in upholding caps. In Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group,"' the California Supreme Court concluded that a
$250,000 cap on non-economic damages was constitutional under the
rational basis test.55 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that
been applied when the law infringes on a fundamental right, such as the right to vote or
freedom of speech or when the law discriminates against a suspect classification, such as race,
alienage, or natural origin. Id. Under this test, when a court examines a particular law, it will
conclude that it does not violate equal protection if there is an underlying compelling state
interest and if this method of accomplishing the state's interest or goal is the least intrusive.
Id. The strict scrutiny test has never been applied to the cap statutes since courts neither
identify the classification created by caps as a suspect classification nor view the right to re-
cover for a tort a fundamental right. See Silby v. Board Supervisors of La. State Univ., 462
So. 2d 149 (La. 1985) (holding that a cap of $50,000.00 was constitutional after applying a
rational basis test).
50. See Treviranus, supra note 34, at 65.
51. Id. at 65.
52. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1488.
53. Most courts uphold legislation when they apply the rational basis test and even when
there is an absence of legislative findings of fact that support the law, the court may suggest a
possible justification for the law. In short, the courts examine the legislation with extreme
indifference to the legislative process as being constitutional.
54. 38 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rtpr. 368, dismissed for want of substantial
federal question, 474 U.S. 892 (1985)).
55. The jury awarded the plaintiff approximately $800,000 for actual or economic dam-
ages and approximately $500,000 for non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering. The
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there was a legitimate state interest because the rising cost of insur-
ance had created a medical malpractice insurance crisis."' The court,
however, reached its decision without examining any legislative his-
tory or empirical evidence regarding why insurance premiums rose.
The court in Fein then examined each of the discriminatory
classes that the cap created. It first concluded that distinction be-
tween malpractice tort victims and other victims was reasonable
since the crisis existed only in the medical malpractice area.57 The
court then examined the distinction between seriously injured medi-
cal malpractice plaintiffs and less seriously injured plaintiffs and rea-
soned that limiting the former group's right to recover was constitu-
tional if it resulted in cost savings to the insurance companies." The
court concluded that neither of the classifications created by the caps
violated the equal protection clause," even though there were no
facts to indicate how caps would affect medical malpractice insur-
ance premiums. In fact the court went so far as to suggest to the
legislature possible ways that the cap might affect the crisis. These
suggestions included: (1) that a $250,000 cap would provide a more
stable basis for insurance companies to calculate insurance rates;
and (2) that a cap would promote out-of-court settlements and de-
crease the litigation costs involved in medical malpractice claims."0
Thus, the Fein court, in applying the rational basis test, required
little, if any, factual basis for upholding the constitutionality of the
cap. Furthermore, the court even went so far as to suggest possible
legislative rationales and justifications for invoking the cap.
While Fein addressed a cap on only non-economic damages,
Prendergast v. Nelson,61 involved an equal protection challenge to a
$500,000 total cap. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the cap
was constitutional based on the rational basis test, but gave a slightly
different rationale than the court in Fein.62 The court first estab-
trial court permitted the plaintiff to receive only $250,000 of the $500,000 since $250,000 was
the limit of recovery set by the noneconomic cap. The plaintiff argued that the cap violated
equal protection because (1) it impermissibly discriminated between medical malpractice vic-
tims and other victims; (2) it discriminated between plaintiffs with economic damages and
those with noneconomic damages; and (3) it denied complete recovery of damages only to
those malpractice plaintiffs with non-economic damages and those malpractice plaintiffs with
non-economic damages exceeding $250,000. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 683-84, 211 Cal. Rtpr. at
386.
56. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 683, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
59. Id. at 162, 695 P.2d at 682, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
60. Id. at 163, 695 P.2d at 683-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
61. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
62. Prendergast, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
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lished that there was a legitimate state interest because of an in-
crease in the number of medical malpractice claims, which led to an
increase in insurance rates, and consequently resulted in the de-
creased availability of health care.63 The court's finding was simply a
declaration that such a situation existed. In examining whether the
cap could rationally be perceived as a remedy for the crisis, however,
the court conclusively stated that the limit on recovery decreased the
severity of the crisis and it therefore upheld the constitutionality of
the cap." The court reached this conclusion despite the lack of any
factual support in the record. The Nebraska Supreme Court opined
that under the rational basis test, the legislature was presumed to
have acted in a constitutional manner and was free to "experiment
and innovate" with legislation in order to resolve the crisis.65
Finally, in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana,6 the
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a $500,000
cap on medical malpractice recovery. In applying the rational basis
test, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the right to re-
cover was a fundamental right and thus denied the plaintiff's claim
for heightened scrutiny.6 7 Similar to the reasoning in the cases
above, the court first assumed that there was a legitimate state inter-
est because a health care crisis existed, and secondly, assumed that
the cap "might" accomplish the objective of assuring the continued
availability of quality health care. 8 Evidence to indicate that there
was either a health care crisis at the time the cap was instituted or
63. Id. at 668. The dissent criticized the court's opinion on the grounds that while it
agreed that the legislature's job was to decide whether a crisis existed, there was, however, a
lack of factual evidence to show an actual crisis. The court's docket did not evidence the
alleged explosion in malpractice litigation. The previous year indicated that malpractice cases
amounted to only I % of the court's docketed cases. Id. at 674.
64. Id. at 669.
65. Id. at 668-69. See also Florida's Patient Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474
So.2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (reaching the same result as the Nebraska Supreme Court in
Prendergast).
66. 462 So.2d 149 (La. 1985). The plaintiff in Sibley was awarded a recovery for an
amount in excess of the $500,000 cap and challenged the constitutionality of the limitation. At
trial, the plaintiff had already required in excess of $423,000.00 in medical expenses alone. In
addition, the nature of the malpractice was such that the plaintiff was left with permanent
brain damage (an I.Q. at approximately 77), which totally disrupted his future plans to attend
college. Id.
In cases such as Sibley, where the economic damages alone almost equal these statutory
limitations, the cap works a large injustice in preventing any recovery for future loss earnings
which in this case may have been a substantial amount given the fact that the plaintiff had
planned to attend college. Additionally, the cap would bar any further recovery for non-eco-
nomic losses.
67. Id. at 155. The Court went on to list some of the established fundamental rights
such as the freedom of expression and association, the right to vote, the right to travel, and the
right to privacy. Id.
68. Id.
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that the cap would have an effect on the crisis was totally lacking in
this case.
In summary, the above cases demonstrate that some courts take
an extremely deferential approach when applying the rational basis
test. These courts assume that cap classifications are valid since a
legitimate state interest exists - an insurance crisis - and that this
state interest "might" be affected by the cap. By reaching such con-
clusions absent any supportive facts, the courts are not providing any
judicial review of the legislative process of deciding what is "right."
These courts have not required proof of the existence of a crisis or
the effectiveness of caps at reducing the crisis.
The use of the term "rational" by these courts is somewhat mis-
leading. A more accurate term for their analyses might be that there
is a "political" grounding to the statutory basis. The statutory basis
need not be strictly logical nor empirical. The voters in the legisla-
tive process provide the political checks on the legislature's "know-
ing" and "doing." If the legislators move in the wrong direction, the
people have the power to elect new legislators who will move in the
right direction. The courts then accept the purpose of such legisla-
tion at face value. As long as these courts find the purpose of the
legislation and the means used to "relate" to that purpose, then the
statute is "rational."
These courts, however, fail to discuss that cap statutes have the
effect of substantially diminishing the power of the courts to fairly
resolve the cases before them. Other courts are bothered by this loss
of power and have developed a "means-oriented scrutiny test"6 to
review equal protection challenges to caps. The means-scrutiny test
requires that a fairly substantial relationship exist between the state
interest or goal and the means used to accomplish this goal.70 This
test requires a higher level of judicial scrutiny than the rational basis
test. The rationale of the means-scrutiny test is that while courts are
in agreement that the right to recover in a tort case is not a funda-
mental right, some courts redefine their rational basis test to raise
the level of scrutiny.
Courts that have applied a means-scrutiny test have typically
held that caps are unconstitutional. In Arneson v. Olson,7 1 the court
held that a $300,000 total cap on damages was unconstitutional be-
69. The means-oriented scrutiny test is hereinafter referred to as the "means-scrutiny
test."
70. See Treviranus, supra note 34, at 66.
71. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
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cause the data presented to the court indicated that the frequency of
malpractice claims in North Dakota was below that of the national
average, and that the insurance premiums for malpractice coverage
in North Dakota were among the lowest in the nation. Based on this
data, the court concluded that there was no health care crisis in
North Dakota and that there existed no legitimate state interest un-
derlying the statute. As a result, the cap on medical malpractice re-
covery in Arneson failed the equal protection test and was held to be
unconstitutional.7 2 The court further stated that the $300,000 total
cap violated the equal protection clause because the cap resulted in
harsh treatment for plaintiffs who were more seriously injured, in
that such plaintiffs may be denied recovery for their economic loss if
the loss would exceed $300,000. The court concluded that the total
cap would fail to adequately compensate plaintiffs with meritorious
claims and would not prevent nonmeritorious claims from being
filed.73
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Carson v. Maurer,74
also applied a means-scrutiny analysis and struck down as unconsti-
tutional a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages. The court stated
that no facts were presented to indicate that a health care crisis ex-
isted; what was the cause for the crisis, if it did exist; or what effect
a cap on non-economic damages would have on the purported cri-
sis. 75 Furthermore, the court ruled that there was a weak relation-
ship between the legislative goal of reducing medical malpractice in-
surance rates and the cap. The court in Carson based its conclusion
on the factual data presented, which indicated that the awards paid
to medical malpractice plaintiffs constituted only a small percentage
of the total malpractice premium costs and that only a few individu-
als suffered non-economic losses greater than the cap limit of
$250,000.76 The cap, therefore, failed the equal protection analysis
and was held to be unconstitutional.
Given the above cases, it appears that when courts apply the
means-scrutiny analysis, they tend to look for additional proof. The
meaning ascribed to the term "rational" in Arneson and Carson is
different than that ascribed to the term by other courts. Some courts
now tie "rational" to a knowledge of a conditon-i.e., the "knowing"
that a crisis exists-and a "knowledge" that the legislation will
72. Id. at 135-36.
73. Id.
74. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 915, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 931, 424 A.2d at 836.
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cause a change in the condition. These courts are not willing to rely
on the legislative process to "know" what is happening "out there"
in the real world. Holding legislative hearings, taking testimony and
putting the legislation to a vote will not persuade these courts to rely
on the legislative process. These courts are also not willing to let the
legislators "know" how to solve a court-centered problem. Instead,
these courts require empirical statistical evidence of the failure of
the tort system, not just anecdotal evidence. The courts, parentheti-
cally, seem to want concrete proof from the "people" that this type
of legislation is beneficial.
The two sets of cases discussed above are equal protection cases,
but reach different results.7 The Fein, Prendergast,9 and Sibley80
cases represent the traditional approach taken by courts in reviewing
social and economic legislation, which requires no evidence of the
existence of a legitimate state interest or of how a new law relates to
this state interest. The traditional courts presume that actions taken
by a legislature are constitutional because a health care crisis exists
and the cap will alleviate the crisis.
The traditional courts primarily rely on the legislatures because
the individual legislators are in a better position to determine
whether a health care crisis exists and whether the cap will alleviate
the crisis. Legislators have access to funds in order to conduct stud-
ies on the issue of health care. They are also bombarded by reports
and opinions from lobbyists and constituents regarding the causes of
the crisis and possible solutions. The legislatures are supposedly bet-
77. Caps have also been challenged on the grounds that they are unconstitutional be-
cause they violate a constitutional clause against special legislation. In Wright v. Central
DuPage Hosp. Assoc., 63 1ll.2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976), the court held a $500,000.00 cap
unconstitutional since it violated the state's constitutional provision against special legislation.
Most states have a constitutional provision within their state constitution preventing special
legislation. One type of special legislation prohibition is a list of prohibited laws and another is
a more general clause that prevents the passing of a special law when a more general law
could govern the situation. See Treviranus, supra note 35, at 79. Special legislation clauses
have been held to be somewhat like the equal protection clause of the federal constitution in
that legislatures cannot treat one class of persons differently than another class if there is no
rational difference between the people. Under this theory, courts have held that caps are spe-
cial legislation because they confer a benefit on hospitals and physicians by limiting their lia-
bility, while not simultaneously conferring this benefit on other health care providers. Wright,
63 lll.2d at 333-34, 347 N.E.2d at 745.
There is also a connection between prohibitions against special legislation and what some
courts have recognized as a due process right to a jury trial. See notes 137-45 and accompany-
ing text. Caps have also been challenged as being unconstitutional as a violation of the plain-
tiff's constitutional right to a jury trial. See infra text accompanying notes 137-46.
78. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr.
368 (1985).
79. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
80. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La., 462 So.2d 149 (La. 1985).
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ter arenas for debating these social issues and for obtaining solutions
that reflect the concerns of the persons injured the most by a health
care crisis. 1 For example, part of the crisis has been caused by the
dramatic increase in insurance premiums. Hospitals and physicians
have been informed by insurance companies that the reason for in-
creased premiums is due to the high cash payouts resulting from
larger jury awards. Physicians and hospitals have complained to the
American Medical Association, which in turn has lobbied for the
enactment of caps on medical malpractice recoveries. Due to this
process, some court have become reluctant to overrule caps because,
presumably, the caps are a desired and scientific solution to the
problem. This attitude is reflected in Prendergast, where the Ne-
braska Supreme Court stated that the legislature was presumed to
have acted in a constitutional manner and was free to "experiment
and innovate" with legislation in order to solve the health care
crisis.81
As stated previously, the courts that apply the means-scrutiny
test to caps do so because the right to recover, while not a funda-
mental right, is nevertheless a right that deserves more protection
than that afforded by the rational basis test. The courts' applications
of a higher level of scrutiny may be viewed as an unwillingness to
trust the legislatures. It,appears that, by requiring a factual basis to
support social or economic legislation, the courts are really dictating
to the legislatures minimum standards that they must meet to enact
a law. If some courts are engaging in this type of conduct, it is ar-
guably an expansion of their judicial role because traditionally
courts have been involved in revising the end results of the legislative
processes, not in revising how the legislatures know that their solu-
tions are correct.
The apparent effect of courts requiring factual proof in support
of caps is that legislatures must support the laws with scientific data
and include this data in the legislative intent portion of the bills. In
essence, the courts are making legislatures third parties to law suits,
since the legislatures must present evidence to the courts to show
why the caps are constitutional. 8
81. id.
82. Prendergast, 199 Neb. at __, 256 N.W.2d at 668-69.
83. Should the legislature fail to support the law with specific data, then the task falls to
the malpractice defense attorney defining the cap. The attorney would have to argue in his or
her brief to the court any available studies concerning caps. This forces the attorney to act in
more of a legislative function than as an advocate for his client.
Whether the court is expanding its judicial role, the point remains that in order for a cap
to be held constitutional under this higher level of scrutiny, the courts must be presented with
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V. Can Studies Prove that Caps are Effective at Reducing the
Costs of Insurance?
Since courts applying the means-scrutiny test require facts in
support of caps, the legislatures presumably must find evidence that
caps lower medical malpractice insurance premiums, thereby making
such insurance more affordable for hospitals and physicians. Overall,
such findings would have the net effect of increasing the availability
of health care services and reducing the escalating costs of such care.
Obviously a "cart/horse" problem exists. Before caps can be judged
effective, they need time to work. How then, may a legislature prove
the effectiveness of caps? The problem is finding analogous earlier
tort reforms to determine whether such reforms present empirical
evidence helpful to caps supporters.
While several studies have been done, the data and studies are
limited and primarily focus on tort reforms of the mid-1970s. Before
examining these studies, it is first important to examine the similari-
ties between the 1970s "crisis" and today's "crisis." Such a compari-
son is necessary to determine whether the results from these studies,
which focus on the events of an earlier decade, are applicable to to-
day's situation.
During the 1970s, the United States experienced a medical mal-
practice insurance crisis similar to the one that exists today. A sur-
vey of medical malpractice insurance markets written in the early
1970s reported:
the costs of a constant level of medical malpractice insurance
coverage increased seven fold for physicians, ten fold for sur-
geons, and five fold for hospitals between 1960 and 1972. The
areas which show the greatest increase in the costs of constant
coverage over these areas were in California and New York City
which increased over 25 % faster than the nation.8"
The 1970s malpractice crisis, like the present day crisis, was marked
by 500 percent increases in insurance premiums in some states and
the withdrawal of some insurance carriers from the market en-
tirely.85 Like today's crisis, the 1970s crisis was allegedly caused by
an increase in the number of medical malpractice claims and an in-
a factual basis in support of the law or the attorney, in his brief, must present these facts to
the court.
84. Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, in DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE & APPENDIX 494 (1973).
85. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 97-117 (1985).
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crease in the severity of awards paid on these claims, resulting in
higher medical malpractice insurance premiums.86 The insurance
companies contended that these two factors had caused them to un-
derestimate the amount of reserves required to meet expected future
claims. 87 As a result, insurance companies were without sufficient
cash reserves to pay all of the medical malpractice claims. Conse-
quently, insurance companies increase premiums in order to generate
additional funds.88
The mid-1970s crisis prompted virtually every state to enact
legislation designed to change the tort system. Although the types of
reforms enacted by each state varied, the changes affected four ar-
eas: (1) the filing of claims; (2) the determination of the amount a
plaintiff may recover, including caps; (3) redefining the standard of
medical care required and changing the plaintiff's burden of proof;
and (4) decreasing the use of courts to resolve medical malpractice
claims by utilizing other methods such as arbitration.8" Most of
these reforms were premised on the belief that they would reduce
malpractice insurance premiums. The problem with these reforms,
however, was that insurance premiums continued to increase. There
was no way of determining how fast insurance premiums would have
increased if the "reforms" had not been in place, because the rela-
tionship between any,'one reform and the rate of increase is
indeterminable.
The most recent survey in this area, which was conducted by
the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) and was con-
cluded in May, 1987, indicates the problem.90 The GAO studied six
86. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: No
AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM OR SOLUTION, HRD-86-50, at 12 (February, 1986).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 13.
90. The General Accounting Office (GAO) study consisted of five reports which are as
follows:
(1) MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: No AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEMS OR SOLU-
TION, HRD-86-50 (February 1986) [hereinafter GAO/HRD-86-50];
(2) MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: INSURANCE COST INCREASED BUT VARIED
AMONG PHYSICIANS AND HOSPITALS, HRD-86-112 (September 1986) [hereinaf-
ter GAO/HRD-86-112];
(3) MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: SIX-STATE CASE STUDY SHOWS CLAIMS AND
INSURANCE COSTS STILL RISE DESPITE REFORMS, HRD-87-21 (December 1986)
[hereinafter GAO/HRD-87-21];
(4) MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CLAIMS CLOSED IN
1984, HRD-87-55 (April 1987) [hereinafter GAO/HRD-87-55];
(5) MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, HRD-87-73
(May 1987) [hereinafter GAO/HRD-87-73].
The studies examined six states, including Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, New York,
and North Carolina. From each state the GAO obtained the following: (1) the views of the
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states that had instituted various types of tort reform, including
caps.91 While the GAO did not study the direct effect of tort reform
on medical malpractice insurance premiums, the study did trace the
movement of "key indicators" in the insurance industry.92 These in-
dicators included the costs of medical malpractice insurance premi-
ums for 1980-86, 91 the frequency of claims filed for medical mal-
practice from 1980-84, the average amount paid per claim, and the
increase in hospital costs per bed due to the increase in insurance
premiums from 1983-85. 9" The results of this study were as follows:
(1) Despite state efforts to curb problems associated with
medical malpractice, physicians' insurance costs in the six states
and for the seven medical specialties studied, increased between
1980 and 1986. These increases ranged from thirty-five percent
for anesthesiologists in California to 547 percent for obstetri-
cians/gynecologists in North Carolina;"5
(2) Between 1980 and 1984, the number of claims filed
continued to increase in all six states ranging from nineteen per-
cent to ninety-two percent;"
(3) The average amount paid per claim increased in five of
the six states. These increases ranged from sixty-four percent to
124 percent;9
(4) As a result of the increase in malpractice insurance pre-
miums in all six states, there was an increase in the hospital
costs per bed in each state. These increases ranged from thirty-
three percent to 114 percent from 1983 to 1985.98
In addition to the above results, it is important to examine the
groups having an interest in the crisis and their opinions of the problem and solution; and (2)
data from leading malpractice insureds on key indicators of the insurance situation. See GAO/
HRD-87-21 at 10.
91. See GAO/HRD-87-21, supra note 90. Other tort reform studies considered the ef-
fect of retaining or modifying the law relating to ad damnum, arbitrators, attorney fees, cost
awards, the collateral source rule, expert witnesses, patient compensation funds, periodic pay-
ments, pretrial screening devices, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, shortening the statute of limi-
tations, special statutes of limitations for minors, and the standard of care owed by physicians.
Id.
92. Only three of the six states that were studied (California, Florida, and Indiana) had
a statutory cap on recovery. See GAO/HRD-87-21, supra note 90, at 10. Also, the GAO
stated that it was unaware of any other studies conducted in the six states that measured the
direct effect of tort reform on insurance premiums. Id. at 14.
93. The study examined the medical malpractice insurance premiums in seven different
areas: internal medicine, general practice, general surgery, anesthesiology, obstetrics/gynecol-
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changes that occurred in the three states that instituted caps as a
method of decreasing the insurance crisis. First, California instituted
a $250,000 cap on the recovery of non-economic damages in 1975."9
While the GAO study did not specifically study the effect of caps on
insurance premiums, the key indicators showed that the insurance
crisis continued to worsen.' Even after the California Supreme
Court held in Fein that the cap was constitutional, insurance premi-
ums continued to increase dramatically in 1985 and 1986 by sixty-
six percent and seventy-one percent, respectively. 101
Likewise, in 1975, Indiana enacted a $500,000 total cap on
damages. In addition to the cap, the Indiana legislature also enacted
a Patient Compensation Fund in order to pay the awards of more
seriously injured medical malpractice plaintiffs. Despite these re-
forms, physicians, who were both insured by the Medical Protective
Company, the state's leading medical insurer, and who participated
in the state Patient Compensation Fund, experienced increased in-
surance costs. These increases ranged from fifty-three percent for
opthalmology/surgery to 116 percent for obstetrics/gynecology, with
an eight-one percent median rate increase." 2
Finally, Florida in 1986 enacted a $450,000 cap on non-eco-
nomic damages. 1 3 Currently, Florida insurance rates continue to
rise but it is too early-to determine any effect the cap may have.
The results of the GAO study tend to support the proposition
that caps are not rationally related to lowering medical malpractice
premiums. Additionally, it may be asserted that none of the above-
mentioned tort reforms have any type of impact upon the medical
malpractice insurance crisis.
The GAO study, however, did not mention how certain factors,
99. Id. Although the cap was in effect since 1975, it was not until 1985 that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held the cap to be constitutional. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,
38 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985). This is important since some critics
believed that the effect which caps may have on lowering insurance premiums may have been
weakened or delayed by the constitutional debate over the use of such reforms.
100. From 1980 to 1986, the rate of premium increases for selected specialties ranged
from 60% for general practice (no surgery and pathology) to 33% for radiology, with a me-
dian increase of 99% for physicians practicing in Southern California and insured by the
doctor's company. The change in premium rates between 1980 and 1986 for Norcal Mutual
Insurance Company, the leading insurer of physicians in Northern California, ranged from a
decrease of 27% for Anesthesiology to an increase of 92% for obstetrics/gynecology, with a
median increase of 69%. See GAO/HRD-87-21, supra note 90, at 26.
101. The cost of primary practice cover with California's largest hospital insurer, the
Farmers Insurance Group of companies, decreased each year from 1980 to 1984, but then
increased 66% in 1985 and 71% in 1986. Id.
102. Id. at 33.
103. Id. at 29.
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such as inflation, may have influenced medical malpractice insurance
premiums. This omission highlights the problem of proving that leg-
islative proposals will be effective based on the experience of other
states. Each state's insurance industry may have unique forces to
consider, such as the size of the cities within the state, the jury selec-
tion system, the investment portfolio of the particular insurance
companies, and the individual cases brought against the defendant
doctors. These unique factors make it difficult to predict the effect
that caps may have in a given state. Consequently, it is very difficult
for states considering caps to analogize based on the experience of
other states with caps already.
In addition to the GAO study, there are several other studies
that focused on the tort reforms instituted in the mid-1970s. The
Danzon Study,104 which is an update of several other earlier studies,
analyzed malpractice claims closed between the years of 1975-
1985.101 This study analyzed the specific effects of different types of
tort reform on the number of claims filed and the severity of awards
paid but, unlike the GAO study, did not examine the total premium
dollars paid in or insurance dollars paid out."' Danzon concluded
that caps had the largest effect on claim severity, reducing claims by
an average of twenty-three percent.10 7 This result corresponds with
Danzon's previous studies, which indicated that caps were effective
in reducing the severity of awards.108 Additionally, both the collat-
eral source rule modification'0 9 and binding arbitration reduced
claim severity by seven percent and twenty percent, respectively. 110
104. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evi-
dence, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1986).
105. Id. at 61. Danzon had conducted several prior studies of the effects of the tort
system enacted in the mid-1970s. See Danzon and Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: Disposi-
tion of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEG. STUDIES 345 (1983), which examines the
claims closed from 1974 to 1976, and concludes that certain reforms did have the effect of
decreasing the severity of awards and the number of claims filed. See also Danzon, The Fre-
quency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, Rand Corp., Report Number R-
287-ICJ/HCFA, Santa Monica, California (1982) (examining claims closed from 1975
through 1978, and concluding that certain tort reforms decreased the severity of awards and
the number of claims filed).
106. Danzon, supra note 104, at 61. Claim severity is the amount of money paid out on
a claim whether by a court order or an out-of-court settlement. Id. at 73.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. The collateral source rule has provided traditionally that no offset will be made of a
plaintiff's award for money received from other sources. One tort reform proposal is to modify
the rule to allow an offset and thereby decrease the plaintiff's award by any other sources of
compensation received as a result of the medical malpractice injury. See GAO/HRD-87-21,
supra note 90.
110. Danzon, supra note 104, at 77. Additionally, it is important to note that Danzon
found that the use of screening panels had no effect on the claim severity, contrary to another
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The Danzon study further indicated that both a shortened statute of
limitations on medical malpractice claims and the modified collateral
source rule reduced the number of claims filed by eight percent and
fourteen percent respectively."'
The Danzon study indicates that caps and other tort reforms
may decrease the amounts paid by insurance companies on claims.
The study does not mention, however, the effects of this savings on
medical malpractice insurance premiums or on the availability of
medical personnel in needed areas. Therefore, one cannot conclude
from the Danzon study alone that caps and other tort reforms have a
positive effect on insurance premiums, even though caps are statisti-
cally related to the two major factors considered to be the cause of
the insurance crisis-the number of claims filed and the severity of
awards.
Finally, there is the study done by Frank Sloan," 2 which also
examined the effects of mid-1970s tort reforms. Unlike the previous
studies discussed, however, the Sloan study examined the individual
effects that tort reforms had upon medical malpractice insurance
premiums. The study focused on insurance premiums paid between
1974 and 1977 in three different fields of medicine: general practice,
ophthalmology, and (othopedic surgery." 3 Sloan studied the effects
of nine different changes in the tort system, which were geared to-
ward reducing the number of claims filed and reducing the severity
of the dollar amount paid per medical malpractice claim." 4 After
considering other factors that might affect the results of the study," 5
Sloan concluded that only screening panels had the effect of reduc-
study which determined that screening panels were the only effective mechanism for reducing
medical malpractice insurance premiums. Sloan, State Responses to the Medical Malpractice
Insurance "Crisis" of the 1970's: An Empirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY,
AND LAW 629 (1985).
I1l. P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 71.
112. Sloan, supra note 110.
113. Id. at 637.
114. Specifically, he examined the effects of the following tort changes: (1) caps; (2)
limiting the provider's liability; (3) limiting the use of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; (4) estab-
lishing patient compensation funds; (5) shortening the statute of limitations for medical mal-
practice claims; (6) restricting attorney fees; (7) eliminating ad damnum clauses from insur-
ance policies; (8) reducing a plaintiffs award by collateral sources of compensation; and (9)
voluntary, binding arbitrations and the use of pretrial screening devices. Id. at 633-37.
115. The focus of the analysis was on the impact of legislative changes on malpractice
premium rates. To isolate the impact of legal influences on the tort reforms, it was necessary
to consider the other possible influential factors such as patient income, availability of lawyers,
and case mix. The premium equation contained three control variables: (1) per capita income
(adjusted by the state price index); (2) surgical operations per one thousand population; and
(3) lawyers per ten thousand population. Id. at 638.
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ing medical malpractice insurance rates.' 16 Caps were found not to
have any impact on premiums.
1 7
Although the Sloan study only examined data from the mid-
1970s, it is still arguably helpful in assessing whether caps may play
a significant role in alleviating the "crisis" of the mid-1980s. As pre-
viously discussed, the 1970s crisis and the current crisis are suppos-
edly similar in severity and alleged causes. Therefore, some groups
may assert that Sloan's results can be applied to today's situation.
They may argue that it is very plausible, given Sloan's results, that
caps will be equally ineffective in curtailing the crisis of the 1980s.
Does this mean that the Danzon study was wrong in its conclu-
sions? Sloan's study involved a different survey, a different time
frame, a different jurisdiction, and a different funding source. While
social science research can provide helpful information, it cannot
logically foretell whether caps will be good or bad for a particular
jurisdiction in the future. Legislatures that choose to rely on these
studies must necessarily confront these difficulties. If "rationality"
means that courts must "know" first that there is a "crisis," "know"
that caps will alleviate the "crisis," and demonstrate that knowledge
with empirically verifiable facts, then the courts could always logi-
cally conclude that the legislature is being irrational.
If a legislature as a body could speak back to the courts, one
may anticipate what its response would be. Since empirical studies
are inconclusive, a legislature could argue that the surveys were done
in order to get legislation passed. The surveys measured the public's
situations and predicted what the results should be after the caps are
instituted. Certain courts could retort that a closer examination of
the legislative process demonstrates the inherent nonrational features
of the legislative process. The legislature's gathering of data is not
random, but is politically driven. Some courts also may argue that,
historically, the relationships between insurance companies and legis-
latures are incestuous and, therefore, the courts should mistrust a
legislatures' information gathering abilities in these situations. Fur-
116. Id. at 640. Danzon, however, argues that Sloan's analysis of the effects of tort
reform on medical malpractice insurance premiums may not account for the lag time between
the institution of such reform and the actual effects. See P. DANZON, supra note 1, at 58.
Sloan, however, did allow for a lag time variable and concluded that 90% of the response to
particular reform takes place the year after the reform was instituted. Sloan, supra note 110,
at 639.
The Danzon study indicated that the number of attorneys in a particular area has no
effect on the severity of award. Danzon, supra note 104, at 76. Contrary to this, the Sloan
study suggested that the number of attorneys in a particular area may result in higher insur-
ance premiums. Sloan, supra note 110, at 643.
117. Sloan, supra note 110, at 640.
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ther, since decisions about caps involve a prediction in the future of
the "good" or "bad" produced by caps, the process is inherently il-
logical because the way things were is not necessarily related to the
way things will be. Therefore, the process can never be totally
rational.
Honest legislators would probably be forced to agree and argue
that the legislative process has never claimed to be rational in that
sense. That is why if the meaning ascribed by the courts to "rational
basis" is that legislation be "logically entailed", then no legislation
would ever be rationally based. The conventional shorthand has been
for society to assert that these are policy matters or areas of "polit-
ics" and "values." In any event, if "rational" is equivalent to "logi-
cally entailed," then caps legislation would never be saved by the
major studies available.
In light of these arguments, it is difficult to ascertain how any
courts could conclude that caps are constitutional. Courts that hold
caps to be constitutional may be doing no more than allowing the
legislatures to "experiment and innovate" in order to resolve the
health care crisis. " 8 Other courts view this experimentation as being
at the expense of seriously injured medical malpractice victims.
Given that caps and other tort reforms have been in place for nearly
ten years with no measurable effects on medical malpractice insur-
ance premiums, it is plausible to conclude that there is no "rational
relationship" between caps and the alleviation of the current health
care crisis. If "rational" means "logically entailed" instead of pre-
sumptively valid, then all legislation may be in dire straights.
VI. The Underlying Nature of the Means-Scrutiny Test
There are two ways that legislatures may view the means-scru-
tiny test as applied to caps. First, legislatures may regard the means-
scrutiny test as refining their data gathering techniques. Viewed in
this way, legislatures should accompany cap legislation with empiri-
cal data to support (rather than prove): (1) that a health care crisis
exists which was caused by increasing medical malpractice insurance
premiums; and (2) that a cap will help alleviate the crisis. " 9
118. See, e.g., Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
119. First, the legislature must gather data to indicate that there is indeed an insurance
crisis in its state. The legislature must also collect data linking the increase in insurance premi-
ums to a negative impact on the health care system. The link is established if either (I) premi-
ums increase the cost of health care services, or if (2) higher premiums reduce the availability
of health care. The higher costs of services can be shown by collecting data from hospitals and
other health care providers which would reflect higher-than-normal increases in the cost of
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The importance of empirical data supporting a cap is illustrated
by Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc.,12 in which the Indiana
Supreme Court upheld a cap based on data that indicated that in-
creased insurance premiums had a negative effect on the health care
system. The record in Johnson showed: (1) seven out of ten insurers
in Indiana ceased or limited writing medical malpractice insurance
because the companies asserted that it was not profitable or because
it was not possible to calculate adequate premiums; (2) premium
rates had increased more than 1,200 percent over the previous fifteen
year period; (3) physicians in high risk specialties such as anesthesi-
ology had difficulty obtaining or were unable to purchase insurance
coverage; and (4) some rural surgeries had been cancelled and some
emergency room services had been discontinued. 2' Based on these
facts, the court reasoned that a legitimate state interest existed for
invoking the cap, and concluded that the cap was constitutional.
A court advocating courts' rights, however, is unlikely to be sat-
isfied by the empirical data supplied in these studies. If close scru-
tiny is given to these studies, more questions are raised. Do these
studies indicate that caps will make insurance more available, cause
premiums to decline, and cause surgeries to be rescheduled instead
of being cancelled? Why are anesthesiologists unable to acquire in-
surance and other doctors are able to purchase insurance even when
there are no caps? Why did the rates go up 1200 percent in fifteen
years?
Perhaps Johnson indicates that scrutiny means a legislature
should obtain data indicating that a cap may partially alleviate the
crisis. The court in Johnson may have used the data to justify a quid
pro quo exchange of societal benefit for loss of damages rights. The
quid pro quo relationship may be better shown by conducting stud-
ies similar to the GAO study, which examined "key indicators" of
receiving health care. It could then be argued that this has resulted from the dramatic rise in
insurance premiums.
The decrease in available health care services could best be proven by obtaining data
showing a decrease in the number of physicians practicing in a particular high risk field of
medicine or in a particular geographical area. The GAO study indicated that the most severe
increase in insurance premiums occurred in the obstetrics/gynecology field of medicine; thus a
study might first focus as this area. Were a state able to gather information regarding this
negative impact on specific areas of medicine, it presumably could "show" the existence of an
insurance crisis. For example, the GAO study indicates the impact on the costs of hospital care
given a certain percentage increase in insurance premiums. It thus could be argued by the
state seeking to enact the cap that, since its medical malpractice insurance premiums have
increased by a certain percentage, there has been a similar increase in the costs of hospital
care. See supra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
120. 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980).
121. Id. at 589.
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the insurance industry."' Such data may indicate a trend of less se-
vere increases in insurance premiums after a cap has been enacted.
A legislature should also collect data concerning the number of
claims in which the amount of damages paid exceeded any potential
cap on recovery, and the total amount of dollars these claims re-
present. Such data would be persuasive in showing that the cap was
not arbitrary and that the cap would significantly reduce the costs of
the insurance companies. The importance of such data is illustrated
in Carson where the court concluded that the cap would not affect
the crisis because its studies indicated that only a small percentage
of medical malpractice plaintiffs suffered losses greater than the cap
amount and thus the cap would not have a great impact."2 3
From a court's perspective, the potential legislative response
outlined above is still not convincing because such data still does not
demonstrate a cap's effect on the future standard of health care in
society. Collecting data on the relationship between caps and the
health care crisis may also be problematic because it could take sev-
eral years from a caps' imposition until there is a noticeable change
in the crisis situation.124 Furthermore, if the studies are completed
by the insurance companies, the potential for bias exists and insur-
ance companies may be perceived as "irrational" in setting premi-
ums. Perhaps for this reason, a legislature should also establish fac-
tual support for the cap by relying on existing government studies.
While the Danzon studies are somewhat convincing that caps may
reduce the severity of awards by as much as twenty-three percent,'25
the Sloan and GAO studies indicate the contrary. Perhaps choosing
the right study, or any study at all, will console some courts. It is
possible, however, that some courts will not be satisfied by any stud-
ies for reasons other than those examined thus far.
A different way to view the courts' heightened scrutiny in exam-
ining damage caps is the view that courts are unlikely to be con-
vinced by any study that concludes that caps are rational in resolving
disputes in medical malpractice cases. Some courts believe it is fun-
damental that courts resolve disputes between individuals according
to common law processes.'2 6 The authority for this position, however,
continues to be disputed.
It is this article's position that the courts' rights holdings cannot
122. See supra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
123. Sloan, supra note 110, at 931.
124. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976).
125. See supra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
126. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
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easily be defended on equal protection grounds or on due process
grounds using only a rational basis test. This article asserts, however,
that the courts' rights holdings should instead be based on modified
due process and separation of powers principles. The courts that de-
fine the term "rational" to mean "empirically proven" should be dis-
regarded, not just because there is federal precedent that uses the
rational basis test differently, but because this means-scrutiny test
has troublesome implications for legislatures preparing to meet the
courts' higher standards of proof. This new relationship between
courts and legislatures may not necessarily be restricted to tort re-
form legislation. Rather, some legislatures may be forced, in other
situations, to produce more proof and different kinds of proof to sup-
port their findings that a crisis exists, and that the legislation may
solve the problem legislatures "find" to exist.12 Such a change may
cause a dramatic and costly rise in empirical epistemology for all
legislation.
The trend of those courts adopting empiricism as a model for
more scientific government, whenever a classification has been made,
is troublesome for two reasons. First, a means-scrutiny test should
not be employed by courts reviewing state legislation because there
is no principled basis for distrust of the majority will as evidenced
through the state-level, republican form of government. While the
"majority will," as expressed in the legislative process, may leave
certain time-honored minority rights unprotected, how will the
courts decide when the minority needs protection and when it does
not? Second, empirical data is, by its nature, a limited type of proof.
Courts certainly have never held themselves to the same impossible
standard of proof.
It truly appears that an epistemological struggle is occurring be-
tween courts and legislatures concerning who knows best how to re-
solve long-standing common law adjudicatory disputes and how each
branch determines what is "best" in certain cases. Courts' rights
courts seem to favor their own decision-making abilities regarding
restricting recoveries and awarding damages because these are time
honored areas of court power, which are intimately connected with
determining fair outcomes. This article asserts that the courts' rights
courts are correct in deciding to protect their turf, but that their true
reasoning has little to do with the "rationality" of legislation ex-
amined under an equal protection, means-scrutiny test. Rather, the
reasoning of courts' rights courts is better understood as a continued
127. Id.
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distrust of the unchecked power of the momentary majority to inter-
fere with the courts. This distrust is a due process concern that is
distinct from other economic substantive due process analysis. The
courts, in essence, should be viewed as possessing veto power over
legislation that substantially alters their common law abilities to re-
solve cases and controversies on an individual basis. The advantage
of due process reasoning is that quid pro quo analysis may be used
to examine the legislation and to ask what has the plaintiff gained by
giving up individualized justice? This analysis may raise, on a more
principled basis, the separation of powers issue that is at the heart of
proposed caps legislation.
The due process arguments have been raised routinely by cap
challengers, but only have been seriously considered in three recent
cases. The only state court to seriously consider the traditional sub-
stantive due process analysis is Jones v. State Board of Medicine.128
That court, however, confused its equal protection analysis with the
due process analysis. In Jones, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed
both a due process and an equal protection challenge to a cap on
medical malpractice recovery, which limited recovery to $350,000.
The court stated that the due process and equal protection chal-
lenges were basically the same because they both required the stat-
ute or regulation to bear a rational relationship to the preservation
and promotion of public welfare.129 The Idaho court reasoned that
the only difference between the two challenges was that the due pro-
cess challenge required the plaintiff to establish the existence of a
recognized "liberty or property interest," whereas the equal protec-
tion challenge required the plaintiff to establish that the statute cre-
ated a discriminatory classification."' 0
While the Jones court stated it did not find this distinction
meaningful, its analysis placed greater emphasis on "process" in due
process than on equal protection. Perhaps the Jones court believed
that substantive due process should not only concern the state's im-
mediate encroachment on individual rights, but also protect the
longer term abuses of power that may result from overreaching by
one branch of government into the expertise of another. Blanket leg-
islative remedies, like caps, may disrupt the balance of power be-
tween branches of government and between segments of society. If
the balancing process has been disrupted, then both courts and in the
128. Jones, supra note 125.
129. Id. at 406, 555 P.2d at 406.
130. Id.
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long run citizens may not be given their due. 3
In Jones, the plaintiff was seeking a declaratory judgment that
the caps statute was constitutional. The defendant in Jones argued
that the cap violated his due process rights because it limited his
right to recover. The defendant further argued that the dollar
amount of the cap was arbitrarily selected for no other reason than
political convenience, and that the cap bore no relationship to any
legitimate public interest.'32 The court in Jones, however, refused to
rule on the due process challenge because the record lacked facts to
show the actual relationship between the cap and the legitimate state
interest. The court insisted that it was not raising the level of scru-
tiny and warned against expecting any change in the deference it
would give to the legislature. Unlike the California court in Fein,
however, the court in Jones did not suggest evidence or examine
studies on its own to support the constitutionality of the legislation.
Instead, the court insisted that the plaintiff, who was seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the statute was constitutional, produce more
evidence regarding data utilized by the legislature as the basis for
the cap.133 To this extent, the court did not defer to the legislature
and declare the act constitutional.
The Jones court stated that it was prohibited from declaring the
act unconstitutional because of Supreme Court holdings that denied
fundamental right status to common law rights.3 The Jones court
went on to declare that language in New York Central R.R. v.
White, which required a quid pro quo whenever a common law right
was taken, was merely dicta. The court in Jones therefore refused to
apply the White analysis. 5 The court in Jones failed to examine
131. Id. at 370, 555 P.2d at 410.
132. Id.
133. It is questionable whether the court would apply the same burden to the medical
defendants were an injured plaintiff to contest a lower court finding that the cap statute was
constitutional. In Jones the court converted the legislature into a moving party with a burden
of proof.
134. Id. at 869, 555 P.2d at 409. The court in Jones extensively quoted language from
several Supreme Court cases:
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.
That is only one of the forms of municiple law, and is no more sacred than any
other. Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be
taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be
changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by
constitutional limitations. Indeed the great office of statutes is to remedy defects
in the common law as they are developed and to adapt it to the changes of time
and circumstances.
Id., quoting New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), quoting in turn, Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) (emphasis added).
135. Id.
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other constitutional bases for exercising greater scrutiny over legisla-
tion, at least in connection with due process considerations. The
Jones court, however, still maintained some lingering doubts about
the legislature's ability to know best about damages and some skepti-
cism towards the legislative process.' 6 In Jones, the court turned its
attention to equal protection analysis in order to support its position.
The court seemed to base its holding primarily on a redefinition of
"rational basis" a technique other courts that advocate courts' rights
have used. Its reliance on equal protection weakened its rationale.
Although the court recognized a due process problem at the root of
its discomfort, it missed the opportunity by relying on other constitu-
tional grounds to justify it greater scrutiny. Jones confused the im-
port of its holding by focusing on equal protection issues such as
proof of rational relations between statute and purpose, rather than
focusing on the legislature's inability to form an equitable blanket
solution and the court's ability to decide damage issues fairly.
The Texas Supreme Court has also recently addressed the con-
stitutionality of caps, but not explicity on due process grounds." 7 In
Lucas v. United States the Texas court rested its decision on the
state's "open courts" guarantee. 3 8 The court noted that it found no
provision in the federal constitution that corresponded to its "open
court" guarantee. " 9 The Texas court did note, however, that its
"guarantee is embodied in Magna Carta and has been part of our
constitutional law since our republic."
0
The Texas court's description of its right to protect its power
over the damages issue is reminiscent of the separation of powers
principles referred to in the worker's compensation cases. It empha-
sized the same notion of the bargain between the people and their
government that the New York Court of Appeals enunciated in Ives
v. South Buffalo Railway."' The Texas Court also cites the Su-
preme Court's 1917 opinion in Wright v. New York Central Rail-
136. Its skepticism was evidenced in the following passage:
[Ilt is argued, and we agree that there is considerable doubt if the purpose of
the limitations as declared by the Act is in fact the true object of the legislative
concern. Also there is doubt as to the relationship between the challenged limita-
tions and the legitimate public purpose that this act may be said to serve. We
therefore deem it prudent to refrain from a decision on the question of due pro-
cess without the production of a more factually revealing evidentiary record.
ID. at 870, 555 P.2d at 410.
137. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
138. 757 S.W.2d at 690.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). For a discussion of Ives, see notes 9-12 and
accompanying text.
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road'42 to justify a quid pro quo analysis that it used to argue that
the Texas statute was unconstitutional. 4 The Texas court found
that no alternative remedy had been provided to the plaintiff in ex-
change for taking away his common law right to compensation for
noneconomic injury.144 Absent, however, the special language of the
Texas constitution, the court seemed unwilling to find a federal con-
stitutional right to noneconomic damages in the due process
clause. 4 6
The importance of the Texas case as it relates to the due pro-
cess argument should not be overlooked. While it rested on its own
unique language, the fact that an "open court" guarantee is in the
Texas constitution is a significant indication of the importance of
separation of powers principles to state constitutional law. The Texas
constitution provides evidence of the strong feelings of its drafters
that a role of courts in balancing individual liberties against state
made law was crucial in order to give citizens their "due" under the
law.
In the federal district court case of Boyd v. Bulala,141 the court
did not have special state constitutional language to justify its hold-
ing. The court, however, appropriately framed the issue regarding
the constitutionality of a cap as a due process challenge. In the opin-
ion by Judge Michaels, the court considered the Virginia cap statute
as a challenge to a citizen's right to a civil jury trial. While the court
could have drawn support from worker's compensation cases that re-
quired a quid pro quo be given a citizen whenever a common law
right is taken away, it instead quickly disposed of the quid pro quo
analysis as a make-weight argument."' The court held that prece-
dent blocked the use of equal protection as a ground for holding the
142. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). For a discussion of Wright, see supra notes 13-17 and accom-
panying text.
143. 757 S.W.2d at 688.
144. Id.
145. The court found it necessary to indicate that states have the right to provide addi-
tional rights for their citizens beyond those guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Id. at 692.
146. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986). Contra Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., No.
PN-87-2203, slip op. (D. Md. 1989) (rejecting the Boyd reasoning and upholding a Maryland
cap on noneconomic injury at $350,000).
In Franklin, Judge Niemeyer explained:
In this Court's judgment, a legislature adopting a prospective rule of law
that limits all claims of pain and suffering in all cases is not acting as a fact
finder in a legal controversy. It is acting permissibly within its legislative powers
that entitle it to create and repeal causes of action. The right of jury trials in
cases at law is not impacted.
Id. at 14-15. See also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 n.9 (1981) (footnote supporting
the position that the federal right to a jury trial does not extend to the remedy phase).
147. 647 F. Supp. at 785-86.
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statute unconstitutional.1 48 Its due process argument instead drew
support from separation of powers principles, but its analysis failed
to combine separation of powers arguments with an examination of
quid pro quo.
1 49
The resulting issues thus were: Does the trial court, both judge
and jury, remain a trusted and useful decisionmaker on the issues of
liability and damages?150 Does a jury provide a useful balancing
function between law and justice when it makes the damages deci-
sion? In Boyd, the court viewed caps legislation as a challenge to
jurors' ability to put a monetary value on a plaintiffs' suffering. 51 It
viewed the statute as demonstrating legislature's opinion that it knew
better than jurors what the limits are of a plaintiff's suffering. The
Boyd decision implied that the issue, when framed as a due process
question, focused on the legislature's attack on the ability of the jury
to resolve disputes fairly. The court found that adjudicative decisions
do not turn on the existence of a crisis in the insurance industry.
Rather, such decisions turn on whether the court can ably determine
the existence of a plaintiff's suffering and its monetary value.
The Boyd court focused primarily on the jury's role in settling
disputes and the need for the jury to retain power over adjudicative
issues. The issue, however, does not simply revolve around a plain-
tiff's right to a jury trial. The decision-making authority of a com-
mon law jury is restricted in many ways. For example, a court can
order a new trial if it does not like the jury's damage award, or the
court can order remittitur, without danger to the parties' constitu-
tional rights. 52 When the right to a jury trial is effectively taken
away, the judge as well as jury, loses control over the case. The Boyd
court then, should have explicitly stated a broader due process and
separation of powers basis for its decision to review the caps legisla-
tion for a quid pro quo rather than relying on the narrower, more
circumscribed, right to jury trial.
Boyd did favor the epistemology of the jury and recognized that
juries work in combination with the trial judge and appellate
148. Id. at 876-87.
149. Id. at 790. In particular, the legislature may not mandate the amount of judgment
to be entered in a trial. Such a measure not only infringes upon the right to a jury where that
right applies, but, when considered in the light of the proper functioning of the legislature and
the judiciary under our system of separation of powers of the respective branches, it also im-
permissibly interferes with the function of the judicial branch. Id
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (1986).
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courts. 153 Judges oversee the jury's decision-making process with the
power to order remittitur and the power to overturn finding based on
prejudice and bias.154 When the focus of the dispute is on which
branch of government knows better what is "just" treatment for in-
jured plaintiffs, even taking into account the economic factors that
exist at the time the dispute occurs, courts should be offended at the
suggestion that they are not doing their jobs. It is not surprising that
courts will strike down cap statutes unless empirical evidence is pro-
vided indicating that the cap will be effective.
The Boyd court's hodling is supported by both the American
tradition of jury trials in civil cases and the separation of powers
arguments that provide the foundation for the seventh amend-
ment. 151 Each branch of government has a different epistemology for
resolving problems. One branch draws on a statewide system of lob-
bying information, while the other relies on the jurors' experience
and the parties proof. One branch is utilitarian in outlook, while the
other is more dogmatic and teleological. The beauty of the balance is
that each branch checks the other in its traditional area of decision-
making power. When a court reviews a statute that limits the role of
the jury in an area where the jury traditionally has made decisions,
the court must look with careful scrutiny for proof that the jury's
decision-making process is harming society. The jury's way of know-
ing and resolving disputes checks the excess of power in the hands of
those with special access to the legislature. In fact, this is exactly
what the Ives court argued when it first held a worker's compensa-
tion statutes invalid. The argument is that if basic law is being
changed and the basic balance of power between the court and the
legislature is being altered, then the court should examine with great




The requirement that civil local disputes be subjected to the jury of peers of
the parties is the lynchpin of a balancing act between legislation and justice.
While neither branch provides a clearly superior system for knowing what is
wrong and how the wrong is to be remedies, at least as to cases and controver-
sies, legislation has been traditionally checked at the local level by jurors and
their understanding of the needs of the local community.
Id.
See also, Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Texas 1988) (where the Texas
Supreme Court, while finding no federal constitutional provision corresponding to its con-
stituion's "open courts" guarantee, noted that access to courts is embodied in the Magna
Carta).
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VII. Support for a Court's Quid Pro Quo Analysis
A. Analogy to Jurisdictional Gerrymandering
A clearer picture of the separation of powers argument can be
drawn from an examination of an analogous area: the various pro-
posals that Congress limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
hear certain types of cases. Those advocating limited federal juris-
diction have been accused of jurisdictional gerrymandering.15 Crit-
ics argue that politics should be confined by principle and legisla-
tures should stay out of the decisionmaking areas of courts.'57
Congress should be prohibited from limiting the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts in certain cases because the constitution dictates a sepa-
ration of powers between the courts and legislature.1 58 For example,
it is absurd to believe that Congress could limit the federal courts'
jurisdiction over cases where blacks sue whites, or Catholics sue
Protestants. 59 While such a statement raises obvious equal protec-
tion concerns, there are other fundamental concerns. Consider that
article III of the Constitution states: "The Judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme court." Marbury v.
Madison,'"0 preserved the Supreme Court's power, at least regarding
matters of original jurisdiction. 61
The separation of powers argument of Marbury, however, is dif-
ficult because the Constitution gives Congress not only the power to
legislate, but also the power to restrict the Supreme Court's appel-
late jurisdiction.6 2 The separation of powers argument, therefore,
must be further supplemented by the implications of the language
found in article III, which limit Congressional intrusions into judicial
matters. Professor Tribe argues that
[t]he power envisioned in article III is the power to decide
• . . [cases] conformably to the law, [including] the constitution
... . This is the very essence of judicial duty. This implies...
nor can Congress replace what the court sees in the legal land-
scape before it with a picture more to Congress' liking."6 3
156. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Fed-
eral Courts, 16 HARV. CR.-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981) [hereinafter Tribe].
157. Id.
158. Id. at 132.
159. Id.
160. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
161. See Tribe, supra note 147, at 132.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 136. Tribe's argument deals with busing and abortion issues. These issues
involve important rights not dealt with explicitly in the Constitution. Tribe, therefore, must
argue by analogy to other court opinions about limitations on Congress' power to deny the
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The constitutionality of damage caps presents an issue similar
to that of jurisdictional gerrymandering. Clearly, if Congress statu-
torily denied damages to an injured party in a case involving consti-
tutionally protected rights, but granted the federal court jurisdiction
over the case, the process would be affected to the extent that the
case could not be decided by the court. An individual's right to vin-
dication would be restricted. While caps do not deny all damages, in
the most extreme cases caps would substantially affect a plaintiff's
ability to recover. Furthermore, inflation would gradually erode the
courts' ability to provide a fair recovery, eventually decreasing the
power of the courts.
Professor Tribe's argument, however, is not made as to the
power of state courts to decide cases. Furthermore, the issue regard-
ing a plaintiff's right to receive full compensation when wrongfully
injured, is not explicitly a constitutional right. Such a right is cer-
tainly a common law right and one that has existed for many years,
both in tort law and contract law.16" The problem is that there is
strong Supreme Court language that on a federal level, common law
rights are not fundamental rights."'
B. Separation of Powers
The question presented by this article, remains whether there is
any basis in state constitutional law that legislative denial of a plain-
tiff's common law right for a court to decide questions of damages
justifies a heightened standard of review. The jurisdictional gerry-
mandering cases give the key to framing a response. The response
must be that, while common law rights are not constitutionally based
fundamental rights, there remains strong separation of powers rea-
sons for state courts to deny presumptions of rationality in favor of
caps statutes.
In order for the checks and balances to work appropriately, the
courts must be free to exercise discretion in determining whether
there is a quid pro quo between society as a potential class of plain-
tiffs and the protected defendants. The courts should be able to de-
courts decisionmaking ability. In doing so he hints at a due process basis for determining these
limitations. Tribe argues that busing decisions should not be taken from the courts through
jurisdictional gerrymandering. In these kinds of cases, where legislation intrudes in a way that
threatens independent rights to vindication, Tribe urges that a high standard of review be
used. Id.
164. See G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 14 (1974); O.W. HOLMES, THE COM-
MON LAw 236 (Howe ed. 1963).
165. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
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termine whether, assuming all members of society have all the infor-
mation regarding caps, society as a whole would accept limitations
on damages in medical malpractice cases, in exchange for the bene-
fits the court projects the caps would produce. The courts, because of
their knowledge of damages claims and the workings of tort law,
should be able to assess the benefits and detriments of caps to society
as well as legislatures do.
Separation of powers principles, therefore, are the basis of the
quid pro quo analysis first articulated in New York Central Rail-
road v. White. The due process quid pro quo analysis correctly pro-
vides for a discussion of separation of powers principles found in
state constitutions, and the reach of the courts' power to review leg-
islation as declared in Marbury v. Madison. The key to the connec-
tion of common law and state constitutional law is that the states
also guarantee that parties are to receive due process of the law,
which implies that civil plaintiffs should receive the individual atten-
tion of courts. The basis of the bargain between citizens and govern-
ment on a state level necessitates treatment of state legislation with
care and concern. A fair meaning that may be ascribed to the term
"due process" is that courts should be a separate source of power
and should check the power of the "momentary" majority's legisla-
tive will.
166
Thus, the intrusion of caps violates the principle, established in
other areas of the law, that if someone is blameworthy and caused
harm they must pay for all the harm they caused as determined by a
judicial factfinder. In addition, there is a practical reason why the
courts should pass on the quid pro quo issues that come before the
courts by using their experience in deciding cases and controversies.
166. See Bacus and Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution,
the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988, 1017 (1982). The term momentary majority
has been attributed to Senator Barry Goldwater who spoke eloquently against court stripping
legislation. Id.
There is also implicit support for courts' rights in the fabric of evidentiary law principles
concerning the nature of the compensatory damages element in tort law. For instance, legisla-
tures have previously agreed that both the existence of insurance or the potential for bank-
ruptcy are legally irrelevant to resolving disputes between civil litigants. Justice in an adjudica-
tory decision is seen by both legislatures and judges as a matter between the parties, and more
fundamentally as part of the definition given to the words "case or controversy," that has been
relegated to the courts. Consideration of insurance would unfairly allow into the question of
damages the ability or lack of ability of the defendant to pay, based on private contracts
between the defendant and third parties. The nature of a dispute between a plaintiff and de-
fendant should not be affected by the wealth or status of the individual. Justice is said to
require that full compensation be paid once the defendant's blameworthiness is established.
See Sullivan v. Old Colony Street Ry., 197 Mass. 512, 516, 83 N.E. 1092, 1092 (1908) (cited
in GREGORY. KALVEN, & EPSTEIN. CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (4th ed. 1984).
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The authority to review caps legislation without giving undue defer-
ence to the legislators comes from the courts' years of experience in
dealing with the issues of damages. Where a court lacks expertise,
deference should be accorded the legislators; however, where a court
deals with its area of expertise, no deference should be given. Court
input on the debate about damage caps is thereby justified, and an
examination of the legislature quid pro quo is appropriate."6 7
The proponents of caps may argue that, on the merits, the cap
law is not an undue intrusion into the ability of the courts to decide
cases. Such an argument is based on the premises that a jury is inca-
pable of deciding accurately the damages a plaintiff has and will
suffer, or alternatively, that societal needs require that the common
law principle of full compensation be replaced with a system that is
more certain. Society generally will benefit from a greater savings on
insurance premiums.
The second argument, however, supports a different basis of re-
view than the one currently used by the courts. The proponents are
proffering a quid pro quo system of analysis which was used with
workers compensation statutes. The courts that found workers com-
pensation statutes constitutional did so by consenting to the legisla-
tures' argument that there was a quid pro quo for the plaintiff em-
ployee. The quid pro quo analysis was in this sense a delegation by
the courts over a limited area of adjudicative power because these
courts agreed that a trade-off was made within the body of the legis-
lation. The court did not veto the legislation.16 8
As to the workers compensation situation, however, the quid
pro quo was not solely some generalized benefit to society as a
whole. It was arguably something that an injured employee would
consent to. Applying this argument to caps, the argument would be
that injured individuals would prefer lower health insurance costs to
full compensation when someone negligently injures them in a severe
way. Clearly, there is no intuitive trade-off for an injured plaintiff
with injuries in excess of the statutory cap."6 9 Yet if the state su-
preme courts agree that there is a benefit equivalent to the parties'
loss of a court hearing, then the court can give up its adjudicative
authority over the damages. This relinquishment should only be a
167. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 483 U.S. 59, 88 (1977) (hold-
ing that it need not decide whether a quid pro quo analysis was required by the due process
clause because it found a quid pro quo to exist, where legislation capped damages at $500
million and provided for further legislative remedies in the event of a nuclear disaster).
168. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
169. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (1986).
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matter of delegation, however, based on the courts' considered exper-
tise or on their agreement that the citizens have spoken on a more
"fundamental" level that they consent to the legislative bargain."'
More troublesome for courts considering the constitutionality of
caps is the argument that juries and judges may be unable to fairly
determine the compensation required to make the plaintiff whole.
Courts view the legislature's statute as an attack on the procedures
they have developed to adjudicate fairly disputes before them.
And what are these procedures and safeguards that the legisla-
ture maintains are unworkable? In this debate, courts would remind
legislators that jurors don't decide cases on short paragraphs of facts
as reported in newspapers, but they are given the fact finding job of
determining the amount of the damages in light of the testimony.
Jurors only decide damages after the defendant has been found to
have breached a regulated standard of blameworthiness. The plain-
tiff must therefore get past defendant's motions to dismiss on the
questions of duty, causation, and breach, each of which must be es-
tablished in most medical malpractice cases by expert testimony.
Without the plaintiff having presented evidence of these three ele-
ments (upon which reasonable minds could differ) the plaintiff would
be unable to even reach the jury on the question of damages. Assum-
ing,however, that the jury has been persuaded that the defendant is
blameworthy, the court still manages the jury concerning the dam-
ages in a number of ways. It can require the jury to respond to spe-
cific questions about damages. It can order a new trial if the jury
verdict is unreasonable, the trial judge can order a remittitur, or the
appellate court can overturn the verdict. After consideration of all
these protections it is an unwarranted intrusion into the court pro-
cess to arbitrarily limit recovery to those who are most injured.
The legislative cap rejects all of these court-developed controls
in favor of an across-the-board blanket solution. The ability of the
courts to produce just verdicts is directly challenged, the epistemol-
ogy of the court is challenged, and the ability of the courts to check
the legislative power of the momentary majority is challenged.
VIII. Conclusion
The due process argument better supports the separation of
powers concern. Even its name deals with process, and legislative
process versus adjudicatory process is the courts' true concern. Sepa-
170. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 285, 294-95, 318-19, 94 N.E. 431, 439-
40, 449 (1911).
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ration of powers principles also provide a basis for the courts' use of
the quid pro quo analysis. It can be argued that caps violate due
process because a cap-may prevent a seriously injured medical mal-
practice plaintiff from receiving an award that a jury deems appro-
priate, without providing an adequate benefit in exchange. Caps, in
essence, abolish the common law process of determining a plaintiff's
full damages."' The quid pro quo analysis also avoid the pitfalls of
the meaning to be ascribed to the rational basis test. The question of
who decides focuses on the characteristics, tools and traditions of the
courts. A court using due process and separation of powers principles
to review a cap should be better able to focus on the legislation for
what it is - a challenge to the court as an institution, without any
guarantee that the parties will be at least as well off.
Caps and other tort reforms do not raise problems simply about
classification systems, but also involve due process concerns regard-
ing institutional encroachment on historical decisionmaking systems.
The due process analysis frees a court to raise these concerns and to
provide for a better balancing of power between the court's way of
"knowing," and the legislature's way of acting.
Ultimately, a court's way of "knowing" then can check a legis-
lature's "knowing" what is right in civil tort disputes. This analysis
is supported by ideas of institutional sovereignty in which each insti-
tution has a tradition of resolving a dispute. A court's cognizance of
its own tradition is useful because it underscores the basic bargain
struck between the people and their government. This common law
tradition is the source of many of a court's powers to define itself.
Therefore, common law tradition justifies the quid pro quo analysis
when examining caps statutes.
171. Treviranus, supra note' 34, at 74.

